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We conducted a seroprevalence study and exposure survey of health-
care workers to assess the risk of nosocomial transmission of Nipah 
virus during an outbreak in Bangladesh in 2004. No evidence of 
recent Nipah virus infection was detected despite substantial ex-
posures and minimal use of personal protective equipment. 
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Nipah virus was first identified during outbreaks of enceph-
alitis in Malaysia and Singapore in 1998 and 1999.16 Detection 
of Nipah virus in urine, respiratory secretions, and cerebro-
spinal fluid means that healthcare workers are theoretically 
at risk for infection.2'78 Studies from Malaysia and Bangladesh 
indicate that the risk of nosocomial transmission of Nipah 
virus is low8"10; however, nosocomial transmission was iden-
tified in an outbreak of infection with Nipah virus in Siliguri, 
India. '" Given known modes of transmission of Nipah virus, 
healthcare workers have been advised to follow standard and 
droplet precautions.812 
Four outbreaks of Nipah virus-associated illness were doc-
umented in Bangladesh from 2001 through 2004.101314 The 
third outbreak occurred between January and February 2004 
and was centered in the Rajbari District, west of Dhaka. 
Twelve residents of 2 adjacent villages became seriously ill 
with fever and altered mental status; 10 died.13 Because of 
increased surveillance for encephalitis during this time, an 
additional 19 cases of Nipah virus infection were identified 
in 7 districts around central and northwestern Bangladesh.13 
The case-fatality ratio for these patients was 74% (23 of 31). 
During the outbreak reported here, 7 patients with sero-
logically confirmed Nipah virus infection presented to a ter-
tiary care center in Dhaka with fever and altered mental status 
2-8 days after their illness onset. Five of the patients also 
presented with cough or respiratory distress. We conducted 
an antibody prevalence study of healthcare professionals who 
provided care to these patients to identify nosocomial trans-
mission and define specific risk factors for transmission. 
M U N I C A T I O N 
M E T H O D S 
This study was conducted at Dhaka Medical College Hospital, 
which is the largest tertiary care facility in Bangladesh. A list 
of all healthcare workers who worked on wards with at least 
1 patient known to have Nipah virus infection was made 
using ward logs and interviews with key hospital staff. All 
healthcare workers, defined as physicians, nurses, cleaners, 
and other types of employed patient attendants (eg, labora-
tory technicians), who reported providing any care to a pa-
tient with Nipah virus infection confirmed by laboratory de-
tection of IgM antibodies against the virus during this period 
were eligible for the study. After the healthcare workers pro-
vided informed, written consent, a 5-mL blood specimen was 
obtained and information about the type of contact with a 
patient with Nipah virus infection, use of personal protective 
equipment, illness history, travel history, and basic demo-
graphic characteristics was collected. Serum specimens were 
tested at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (At-
lanta, GA) with an IgM-capture enzyme immunoassay for 
detection of IgM antibodies and an indirect enzyme im-
munoassay for IgG antibodies that used Nipah virus (Ma-
laysian prototype) antigens.15 Test results were communicated 
to study participants in a confidential, sealed envelope. Ap-
proximately 10 weeks after the first interview and blood spec-
imen collection, all healthcare workers with positive test re-
sults in the initial sample received a follow-up interview to 
gather in-depth information about their care-giving practices, 
personal-protection practices, and illness history. A second 
blood specimen was also obtained at this time to identify any 
change in antibody titers. 
RESULTS 
In total, 105 healthcare workers (26 physicians, 68 nurses 
[including nursing students], and 11 cleaners or other patient 
attendants) were enrolled in the study from March 24-30, 
2004, after reporting that they provided care to a patient with 
Nipah virus infection between January 18 and February 24, 
2004. One employee, a physician, refused to participate in 
the study. An unknown number of student nurses who may 
have cared for patients with Nipah virus infection could not 
be located at the time of the study, because they were no 
longer working at Dhaka Medical College Hospital. Although 
every effort was made to list all healthcare workers exposed 
to patients infected with Nipah virus, it is possible that the 
list was incomplete. The mean age of study participants was 
28 years (range, 17-60 years); most (73%) were women. 
The most commonly reported type of contact with a patient 
with Nipah virus infection (50% of study participants) was 
washing or changing bed sheets (Table). A few healthcare 
workers (28%) reported using any kind of personal protective 
equipment "most of the time" while caring for Nipah virus-
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TABLE. Type of Healthcare Worker Exposures to Patients With 
Nipah Virus Infection During January and February 2004 at Dhaka 
Medical College Hospital, Dhaka, Bangladesh 
No. (%) of 
healthcare 
workers exposed 
Type of exposure (« = 105) 
infected patients. Twenty-three (34%) of 68 nurses reported 
using personal protective equipment, compared with 5 (19%) 
of 26 physicians. Of the 29 respondents (28%) who said they 
used personal protective equipment "most of the time" while 
caring for patients with Nipah virus infection, latex gloves 
were used by 25 (86%), and surgical masks were used by 7 
(25%). Use of eye protection was negligible. Thirty-four study 
participants (32%) reported having had unprotected expo-
sures to potentially infectious bodily secretions while provid-
ing care for patients infected with Nipah virus, including 
receipt of a splash in the eye, mouth, or nose with a bodily 
secretion or a needlestick injury (Table 1). 
No study participants had IgM antibodies against Nipah 
virus. However, 2 nursing students who reported changing 
bed sheets for patients with Nipah virus infection had IgG 
antibodies against Nipah virus (IgG antibody titer, 1 :400), 
suggesting previous infection. Neither of these nursing stu-
dents reported any known unprotected exposure to body flu-
ids of patients with Nipah virus infection or a history of travel 
to areas in which there was an outbreak of Nipah virus in-
fection. Only one of the nursing students reported using per-
sonal protective equipment (ie, mask and gloves) while caring 
for these patients. Although this student reported that she 
had had measles approximately 3 months before the study 
(her measles vaccination status was unknown), neither she 
nor the other nursing student reported any lifetime history 
of febrile illness associated with altered mental status. Ap-
proximately 2 weeks after first providing care to a patient 
with Nipah virus infection, the second nursing student ex-
perienced a febrile illness with headache. No change in an-
tibody titers was observed between the first and second blood 
specimens collected from either student (IgG antibody titer, 
1 : 400 for both students). Although 12 healthcare workers 
(11%) reported experiencing a febrile illness between January 
18 and the end of March 2004, none reported experiencing 
altered mental status. 
DISCUSSION 
Although healthcare workers commonly had unprotected ex-
posures to potentially infectious bodily secretions of patients 
with Nipah virus infection, no evidence of acute Nipah virus 
transmission to healthcare workers was observed in this study. 
Neither healthcare worker with IgG antibodies against Nipah 
virus reported a history of illness with altered mental status 
in their lifetime. It is possible that they experienced a mild 
form of Nipah virus-associated illness, as described during 
the outbreak in Malaysia,16 or, albeit less likely given the size 
and diversity of the Paramyxoviridae family, that the anti-
bodies detected were in response to infection or exposure to 
another pathogen and were cross-reactive with Nipah virus 
antigens. Given that IgM antibodies persist in the serum of 
most patients with Nipah virus infection for at least 3 months 
after illness onset,17 the absence of IgM antibodies only 4-7 
weeks after exposure and the low and unchanging IgG an-
tibody titers indicate that these staff members were not in-
fected with Nipah virus during this outbreak. These nurses 
had no known previous exposure to other patients with Nipah 
virus infection. 
Evidence of person-to-person transmission of Nipah vi-
rus,914 coupled with previous findings about the presence of 
virus in respiratory secretions, urine, and cerebrospinal fluid, 
indicates that nosocomial transmission of Nipah virus is plau-
sible, and infection control practices need to consider this 
possibility, even in the absence of transmission in this study.2,7,8 
Differences in the risk of nosocomial transmission between 
outbreaks could be explained by strain variation or patient-
care practices in medical facilities. 
Use of personal protective equipment in this study group 
was low and unprotected exposures common. These findings 
are consistent with other reports of personal protective equip-
ment use and needlestick injuries from developing coun-
tries1819 and are likely associated with a lack of knowledge 
about transmission risk for healthcare workers and the limited 
availability and access to personal protective equipment in 
this resource-poor setting. 
The findings of this study are limited because of the 
amount of time between the exposure and the first (4-7 
weeks) and follow-up (10 weeks) interviews, which may have 
increased recall bias. It is possible that healthcare workers 
who cared for patients with Nipah virus infection may not 
have remembered doing so and were therefore excluded from 
the study. Likewise, study participants who remembered car-
ing for patients with Nipah virus infection may not have 
recalled all their specific patient care activities or any signs 
of illness they may have had. However, because of the high 
Washing and changing bed sheets 
Performing a physical examination 
Drawing blood 
Direct skin contact with respiratory 
stool, urine, or blood 
Providing suction 
Giving an injection 
Placing a canula 
Placing a nasogastric tube 
Performing funduscopy 
Changing bedpans 
Receiving a needlestick injury 
Performing lumbar puncture 
secretions, 
Being splashed in the eye, nose, or mouth with 
respiratory secretions, stool, urine, 
Placing a catheter 
or blood 
52 (50) 
38 (36) 
35 (33) 
30 (29) 
27 (26) 
25 (24) 
17 (16) 
11 (10) 
10 (10) 
7(7) 
7(7) 
6(6) 
6(6) 
2(2) 
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profile of the outbreak and fear of nosocomial transmission, 
it is unlikely that healthcare workers who spent a significant 
amount of time caring for patients with Nipah virus infection 
or who experienced serious illness after their exposure would 
be unable to recall such an event. It is also possible that study 
participants exaggerated their use of personal protective equip-
ment because of messages they received during the outbreak 
that reinforced standard precaution use. Therefore, the risk 
of exposure to study participants may be greater than we have 
reported. 
The risk of nosocomial transmission of Nipah virus during 
this outbreak appears to be low but likely not negligible. Given 
the reports published elsewhere on possible nosocomial trans-
mission911 and the 2 IgG antibody-positive participants and 
lack of personal protective equipment use by healthcare work-
ers in our study, interventions to improve infection control 
are needed, especially during outbreaks. 
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